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Abstract 
Recent experiences in Latin America and Asia provide ample evidence that countries 
in the process of integration are increasingly exposed to internal and external economic 
shocks. More importantly, this growing vulnerability of particularly developing economies 
has the potential of undermining decades of development efforts. The Asian crisis clearly 
demonstrates that we are increasingly unable to predict the triggers of such crises, and 
certainly lack the institutional arrangements to contain them. This translates into the fact that 
our ability to manage the interaction between domestic and international economic forces is 
limited or undermined by certain factors. This practical outcome has the potential to delay 
the process of globalization and integration of developing economies into the world 
economy. 
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Introduction 
Emerging economies of Asia and Latin America have experienced a phenomenal 
growth throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Much of the credit has been attributed to increasing 
liberalization and growing integration of these economics to triad economies of North 
America, Europe and Japan. Alleged integration progressed in two separate yet interrelated 
fronts: in real sectors of these economies through trade and foreign direct investments and in 
financial sectors through portfolio investments. Asian strategies involving a governed market 
created impressive economic growth in the last twenty years. 
Mexico experienced the first severe currency crisis in the post-liberalization period in 
December 1994, and contagion effects were quickly felt in the region (particularly in 
Argentina). The second crisis started in Thailand in the summer 1997, and contagion took 
effect immediately bringing a large number of Asian economics to the brink of a collapse. 
Since then, other countries have followed like Russia and more recently Brazil. A number of 
Latin American countries are even considering replacing their national currencies with the 
U.S. dollar. 
By analyzing the globalization of the world economy, this paper will shed light on the 
causes of Asia’s currency crisis. Finally, some concluding remarks on the challenges faced 
by emerging nations will be presented. 
 
Asian currency crisis 1997-1998 
The Asian crisis has quickly attracted the attention of the academic community and 
financial press due to its widespread implication on the global economy. Economists and 
analysts presented a range of competitive and/or complimentary perspectives on the crisis. 
These explanations can be grouped in four categories. The first perspective stresses 
deterioration of the macroeconomic conditions in the region. A particular emphasis is placed 
on the external sectors and growing current account deficit as a percentage of GDP. The 
second perspective focuses on the fundamentals of Asia’s economic model and questions the 
effectiveness of the governed market approach in the long run. The third perspective attracts 
attention to the destabilizing nature of capital flows and potential power of global financial 
markets in inflicting damage on fundamentally sound economies. And finally the fourth 
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perspective questions the efficiency of financial markets and describes the working of a panic 
in financial markets with reference to the Asian contagion. 
 
Deterioration in Macroeconomic Fundamentals 
A quick review of macro economic indicators in Malaysia, South Korea, Indonesia 
and even Thailand does not lend immediate support to macroeconomic decay or weakness 
arguments. Although some governments in the region had committed to ambitious 
infrastructure investment programs, public sector balances did not point to rampant fiscal 
imprudence. Even though higher than industrialized country averages, inflation rates were 
moderate, and did not concern investors or analysts. 
On the other hand analysis of private sector balances indicated that investments in 
excess of domestic savings created a fundamental imbalance. This gap between private 
investments and the private savings also explains the current account deficit. Although this 
savings deficit was progressively financed by external capital flows, it was not perceived to 
be an alarming sign of deterioration because of two reasons: First this deficit that was fully 
attributable to the private sectors and was not perceived to be a major macroeconomic 
problem. In other words, it should have been the result of optimal allocation decisions made 
by the economic agents. Second, the source of private sector deficit was not due to declining 
savings (or increasing consumption), but due to higher levels of investment. 
Economists argue that a current account deficit resulting from higher investments 
should be more sustainable, since these investments may create productive capacities that 
generate export revenues to pay back for the external debt used to finance the current account 
deficit. In other words as long as these investments were channeled into export oriented 
manufacturing projects, they were safe. The legacy of three decades of export oriented 
development strategies in Asia led the investors and analysts to believe that this was the case. 
However, investment patterns started to deviate from this traditional pattern in early 1990s 
and increasingly channeled into local service sectors and lucrative property markets 
particularly in Thailand, and to some extent in Malaysia and Indonesia. The only exception to 
this was South Korea, where investments continued to concentrate in manufacturing. Cosetti, 
Pesenti and Roubini (1998) also present a convincing case of declining productivity and 
profitability of investments by using Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR). The main 
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argument is that Asian investments generated less and less growth per unit investment in 
their economies. They also point to sharp declines in corporate profitability by using a 
sample of South Korean companies. 
The deviation of investments from traditional patterns of tradable sectors to non-
tradable sectors and lower productivity of these investments infused a range of problems in 
Asian economies. One of these problems was the asset inflation that was fueled by 
uncontrolled domestic credit growth. This has created significant problems in the financial 
sectors, which increasingly intermediated domestic and foreign funds into less productive 
use. Financial institutions in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia were progressively exposed to 
booming property sectors. In addition to this, it is claimed that financial institutions also 
provided financing for investments in the stock markets (secondary), and extended property 
or stock collateralized loans. This growing exposure to speculative investments created an 
enormous vulnerability in the financial systems of particularly Thailand and Indonesia and to 
a lesser extent in Malaysia. 
An even more concerning dimension of these vulnerabilities was the source of 
financing used by the financial institutions. Financial institutions exploited a very profitable 
opportunity by borrowing in international markets in foreign currency and converting them 
into high interest domestic loans. Growing optimism in international financial markets about 
emerging markets led to a significant decline in spreads attached to emerging market loans 
and created a conducive environment for large syndications. The result was a highly exposed 
financial sector, which started to show some early signs of weakness in Thailand in 1996 and 
in Malaysia and Indonesia in 1997. On the other hand, there was great deal of ambiguity 
about the extent of the problem in countries other than Thailand. 
As it was discussed above the progression of the external sectors also did not send 
strong crisis signals with the exception of Thailand and Malaysia. Although there were 
indications of deterioration in the current account balances of the regional economics, their 
export capabilities and offsetting capital inflows to the region did not won)’ most observers. 
An analysis of trends in current account deficit over 1990-1996 reveals fluctuations in the 
deficit. It was below 5% of GDP in South Korea despite a surge from 1.81% of GDP to 
4.76% of GDP. In Indonesia it ranged between 0.82% to 4.40%, but it improved to 3.41% in 
1996. In Philippines it was stabilized between 5 and 6% in 1995 and 1996. Malaysia which is 
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the most open economy among the Asian-5, experienced a surge in current account deficit 
between 1993-1995, but brought it sharply down to 5.2% of GDP in 1996. In midst of 
optimism about the growth performance of the region, these indicators were not perceived to 
be clear signals of trouble. 
Real exchange rate appreciation was pointed out as a factor that contributed to the 
deterioration in trade accounts. The impact of this factor was not very clear either. The 
pegged currencies of the region, notably the Thai Baht, experienced devaluation as the US 
dollar depreciated against major currencies between 1991 and 1995. However JP Morgan 
data indicated that it appreciated in real terms during this period. Malaysia’s Ringgit also 
experienced a sharp appreciation until 1993, and depreciation in 1994. Indonesia’s Rupiah 
experienced a real appreciation between 1990 and 1993, and slight depreciations until 1995. 
South Korea’s Won depreciated in real terms until 1994 and experienced a slight 
appreciation in 1995. All Asian five, and Singapore and Hong Kong experienced a real 
appreciation in 1996 with respect to 1990 and 1995 with the exception of South Korea. 
It is not clear that, if these real appreciations were justified with productivity 
increases in the region. It is easier to assess these revaluations ex-post in light of evidence 
about the productivity of investments during the 1990-1997 period, which leads us to the 
conclusion that productivity increases were not significant, therefore revaluations were not 
justified. On the other hand, during the event window of 1997, there were few concerns about 
the impact of real exchange rate appreciation. In the final analysis, the so called 
macroeconomic weaknesses that were identified in the aftermath of the crisis and discussed 
above, were neither typical “crisis signals”, nor ex-ante perceived to be serious problems in 
the midst of fairly optimistic expectations about the region’s future economic performance. 
 
Failure of the Asian model 
Much praised Asian economic development model was widely debated among 
economists after the publication of a World Bank report entitled “East Asian Miracle”. 
Young (1992), Rodrik (1994), and Krugman (1994) among others, disagreed with the label 
“miracle” and attributed the sustained growth in East Asia to unusually high physical 
capacity increases. Their fundamental disagreement with the report was on the issue of total 
factor productivity (TFP), which contained information regarding the contribution of 
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technology and innovation to the productivity increases. They argued that the gains in the 
TFP in the East Asian setting were insignificant, and Asian growth was destined to slow 
down once the physical investment limits were reached. Critics of the Asian model also 
questioned the efficiency of resource allocation process through governed markets and 
argued that sustained deviations from market mechanisms bound to impose severe limitations 
in more advanced stages of development. The accumulation of problems in the financial 
systems and corporate sectors were linked to these early critical analyses of the Asian model 
and increasingly identified with the label “Crony Capitalism” which apparently were used to 
stress the deviations from Anglo-Saxon capitalism. This perspective emphasizes the 
favoritism, insufficient supervision and regulation and rampant inefficiencies in allocation of 
resources as the root factors of the crises. It is argued that intertwined government and large 
corporate conglomerations increased the moral hazard in the financial systems, and fueled 
careless capital allocations without any regard to risk. Although the core of the arguments 
developed in this perspective has some validity, it fails to capture the significance of other 
factors and undermines the sustained progress in the region for over three decades. 
 
Destabilizing Capital Flows 
Traditionally high domestic savings rates in East Asian countries reduced the 
dependence on external capital during the high growth periods until late 1980s. However 
sustained high rate of growth and surge in domestic investments created the need for external 
capital flows. The surge in private investments was the primary source of growing need for 
external capital in most of these countries. This need became increasingly visible as current 
account deficits increased. 
While a growing need for external capital emerged, there was no shortage of investors 
and creditors to the region. Net capital inflows to five Asian countries (South Korea, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines) were $47.4bn, $80.9bn and $90.8bn 
respectively in 1994, 1995 and 1996. These flows were more than offsetting current account 
deficits and led to increases in foreign exchange reserves. During the 1990-1996 period, 
growth in foreign exchange reserves ranged between 127% and 183% (935% in Philippines). 
Foreign direct investments, the most stable component of capital flows, financed a 
considerable portion of the current account deficit. Since high growth in the manufacturing 
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and service sectors created a significant demand for credit in the banking system, this 
demand driven increase in interest rates presented an attractive profit potential for large and 
credible domestic banks. They channeled the funds borrowed in the international capital 
markets in dollar or Yen terms to domestic currency denominated loans in local markets. The 
declining spreads in syndication loans, and accessibility to international markets created 
significant profit margins for the domestic banks. However allocation of these funds to 
inefficient diversified conglomerates which kept creating over-capacity in their industries, 
and highly lucrative real estate deals which created the asset bubble problem, created an 
explosive exposure for the regional financial institutions. 
Although capital inflows to Asia does not seemed to create some of the problems 
experienced in other developing countries such as an inflationary pressure, it gradually 
contributed to an exchange rate overvaluation, monetary expansion through increased 
domestic lending, asset inflation and a build up in short term liabilities. This combination 
obviously prepared the grounds for a crisis that can be triggered by a domestic or external 
shock, or a panic in financial markets. The Asian crisis clearly demonstrates the increasing 
sophistication of determination of appropriate level and mix of capital flows in a global 
economy. The urge to reconsider the role and stage of capital account liberalization in the 
economic reform process is not baseless under the light of the current evidence. 
 
Financial Panic 
The combination of financial deregulation, contagion and erratic behavior suggests 
that financial markets are not a symbol of market perfection. This is even more pronounced 
in international financial markets where a Debrew-Arrow type of efficiency is not possible 
due to vast informational asymmetries (Wyplocz, 1998). In other words, agent’s access to 
information set, and their ability to incorporate information to prices is quite limited in the 
international context. An expected outcome of this is the occasional misfunction of the 
financial markets, which create dramatic impact on the real sectors in terms of output and 
employment. 
A fundamental distortion to market efficiency comes from informational asymmetry 
in international financial markets. By definition lenders know less about the borrowers about 
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the latter (Wyplocz, 1998). This leads to moral hazard and adverse selection. Since lenders 
have limited information about the borrowers, they either prefer not to lend or to charge high-
risk premiums to compensate for the risk. This inherently creates high loan prices in 
international markets. Borrowers with good credit tend to not to borrow at these rates. In 
other words, there is no interest rate that would bring good borrowers and lenders together. 
This leads to adverse selection, and credit intermediation leans towards risky parties 
in international markets. Also lenders look for implicit guarantees such as borrowers good 
relationships with governments, market power etc. Lenders often ration credit, and limit their 
exposure to risky borrowers. However, when the economic climate is optimistic they relax 
their credit rationing and increase their exposure to risky borrowers, particularly to those who 
can provide implicit guaranties. On the other hand, when economic outlooks take a 
pessimistic turn, lenders immediately invoke credit rationing, and borrowers are denied new 
loans. The rush to collect the previous balances may quickly turn into a panic, and the 
borrowers who are denied new loans face a liquidity crunch. If the funds dry out in domestic 
and international markets, liquidity problem transforms itself to an insolvency problem. The 
panic becomes a systemic problem, and quickly spreads into real sectors. 
Another channel where the financial panic is triggered is the case of multiple 
equilibria. Multiple equilibria implies that the actions based on expectations of a particular 
outcome, can deliver that outcome. In other words the expectations that are ex-ante 
unjustified are validated by the outcome that provoked. In financial markets, a perceived 
weakness in an economy may easily create the expectation that the markets will collapse at 
some point. Although the fundamentals at the time may not justify this expectation, actions 
of the agents triggered by this expectation may lead to a crisis in currency, debt or equity 
markets. In other words, multiple equilibria could trigger self-fulfilling crises. 
Financial panic is more likely to develop in environments where capital mobility is 
high and financial market supervision is inadequate. In such environments, any weakness in 
the financial system and macroeconomic fundamentals may quickly evolve to a crisis. 
The Asian case lends strong support to adverse selection and moral hazard in the 
sense that was explained above and multiple equilibria where self-fulfilling crises develop 
quickly. As it was mentioned above, although there were macroeconomic weaknesses in the 
Asian economies, they were not as significant as to justify the scale of the collapse. However, 
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expectations that the markets would collapse, brought the outcome that was not justified  
ex-ante. 
 
Economic development and lessons from currency crises 
The damage created in the real sectors of the economies hit by currency crises has the 
potential to dictate a new set of priorities in the economic development process. The classical 
currency crisis scenarios were invariably linked to large public sector deficits caused by 
government profligacy, high inflation, rampant real exchange rate appreciation and a 
growing current account balances (Krugman, 1998). Policy recommendations developed by 
multilateral development agencies were quick to emphasize prudent macroeconomic 
management with balanced public sector budgets. The Mexican experience proved the 
inadequacy of this condition and directed the attention to the dangers of accumulation of 
short-term debt by governments. Another lesson learned from the Mexican crisis of 1994 was 
the incredible power of the international financial system. Although there were traces of 
financial panic and imperfections in the international financial system, this power was 
interpreted as international financial market’s ability to punish governments committing 
undesired policies by the global investors. 
The Asian crisis has made it clear that triggers of crisis are becoming increasingly 
difficult to predict. The potent message is that macroeconomic prudence and stability, a 
prerequisite to growth, are not sufficient conditions to immunize an economy to external 
shocks, unless a range of collateral factors accompanies them. 
The most important of these collateral factors is the development of a sound financial 
system. The key characteristics of a sound financial system are effective and efficient 
intermediation of funds, a sound institutional infrastructure, regulation and supervision. The 
current development paradigm emphasizes macroeconomic stability and liberalization of 
current and capital account without any particular reference to the financial system. The 
current episode of currency crisis indicates that development of the sound financial sectors 
should take precedence to capital account liberalization. Although most emerging economies 
have introduced financial market reforms, these reforms focused on the effectiveness of fund 
allocations. As capital account liberalization facilitated access to international capital 
markets, the volume of funds intermediated by these institutions reached to significant levels. 
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However, as it was evident in Incremental Capital Output Ratio, growing inefficiency of the 
fund allocations and moral hazard motivated by lack of regulation and supervision, as well as 
implicit and explicit guarantees in the financial systems, created the grounds for a financial 
crisis with potent implications in the real sectors. 
The Asian crisis raises legitimate concerns for developing economies in the process 
of reforming their economies through privatization, deregulation and liberalization. It 
exposes the difficulties of macroeconomic management in an increasingly integrated world 
economy. Although it is not expected to change the course of liberalization of developing 
countries including the ones struck by the crisis, it will lead to a search for a new 
development paradigm with revised priorities in the reform process. In this process 
development of a comprehensive institutional infrastructure including laws and regulations 
governing intermediation practices of financial institutions should be an absolute priority, 
and any deregulation in the financial system should be designed and monitored very 
carefully. Liberalization of capital account should only then be considered. 
Development of sound financial systems is a prerequisite for the development of 
competitive industries and individual companies in these industries. The impact of financial 
crises on the real sectors creates significant systematic risks for developing country 
companies that increases the cost of investment capital and creates a significant impediment 
for further development and growth. Particularly, for companies that are striving to make a 
transition from low-technology/labor intensive industries to high technology-proprietary 
product markets, the systematic risk factor imposes a significant barrier for the transition. 
Asian crisis is loaded with lessons for progressive companies operating in relatively 
protected emerging markets. It has shown that strategies designed without regard to global 
demand and supply dynamics bound to fail. It has also proven that substitution of markets by 
technocratic guidance systems gets progressively ineffective at higher levels of economic 
development. Building well functioning contestable markets with adequate business and 
legal infrastructure should be incorporated in economic development programs. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Even though the benefits from integration are undeniable for both developed and 
developing economies, recent experiences in Latin America and Asia provide ample 
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evidence that countries in the process of integration are increasingly exposed to internal and 
external economic shocks. More importantly, this growing vulnerability of particularly 
developing economies has the potential of undermining decades of development efforts. The 
Asian crisis clearly demonstrates that we are increasingly unable to predict the triggers of 
such crises, and certainly lack the institutional arrangements to contain them. This translates 
into the fact that our ability to manage the interaction between domestic and international 
economic forces is limited or undermined by certain factors. This practical outcome has the 
potential to delay the process of globalization and integration of developing economies into 
the world economy. 
While integration of national financial markets culminating to a global financial 
market offers vast opportunities for individual countries and companies operating in these 
environments, it presents a set of very serious challenges. Liberalization and deregulation of 
national financial markets in the process of integration should follow development of sound 
financial systems furnished with a very comprehensive legal infrastructure, adequate 
regulation and supervision, that would reduce the possibility of system-wide exposures and 
collapses. An important dimension of the sound financial system is increasing transparency 
that would naturally reduce informational asymmetries in international markets. Another 
important dimension is the National and Supranational coordination of the supervision. 
Development of new supranational bodies or improvement of the existing ones such as the 
IMF and BIS is essential to reduce the systemic risks. 
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